Søren in Norwegen

Dies hier schreibe ich fuer den Fall, dass immer noch jemand denkt, dass unsere Hand und das Zusammenspiel derselbigen mit dem Gehirn einzigartig waeren. Also im Sinne von „Vorhaut oder Vorschlaghammer? Ich pack das schon!“. Und dass die Roboter das noch lange niemals nicht kønnen werden!

Solche Personen verweise ich ab sofort auf das Video mit dem „Universal Soft Robotic Gripper„.

Tja! Wenn der Roboterchirurg das Skalpell im Patienten fallen laeszt, dann kann der das auch wieder aufheben.

Und so lange ich auch gute Nachrichten habe, versuche ich die Roboterartikel immer mit einer solchen abzuschlieszen. Dieses Mal ist es zwar schon aelter, aber trotzdem toll: China scraps construction of 85 planned coal power plants.
Das ist deswegen extra toll, weil die Planung eines Kraftwerkes ein unheimlich kompliziertes Vorhaben ist. Sowas wird nicht mal einfach so auf Eis gelegt. Es sei denn, dass sich innerhalb kuerzester Zeit alternative Energiequellen als viel besser fuer das Vorhaben herausgestellt haben. Signifikant besser als selbst die optimistischsten Vorhersagen eingeraeumt haetten.

Cool wa! Also beides mein ich.

4 Conclusion

In this paper I’ve presented an analysis which shows that nuclear power plants are economically not sustainable in a capitalistic society. Thus, as the historic data for the U.S. shows, during the heavy construction phase in the 70’s and 80’s almost half of the ca. 200 applied for nuclear power plants never got completed.
Further I’ve briefly shown that probably even the often praised capability to reduce GHG emission with nuclear power may be very much exaggerated since the production of nuclear fuel is dependend on the uranium content on the ore and the lower the uranium content the higher the energy needed to extract it.
Lastly I’ve presented some general points regarding the social non-sustainability of nuclear power.

Brook et al. mention in [14] six conditions for the economic viability of nuclear power.
The first condition (no unfair subsidies for renewable energy technologies) is discussed in section 3.1.
The second condition, that standardization will lower the costs, was shown not to be true in the case of the french nuclear fleet [23].
The third condition, that a long term governmental energy policy is needed, can be met just with wonder. This has in the U.S. always been the case. Starting with the famous „Atoms for Peace“-speech of President Eisenhower [55], vigorously advocating for legislation in favor of nuclear power in the 2000’s³² [38, 56], and lasting support until today [18]. Nonetheless seems nuclear power not to attract the interest of profit oriented investors.
Taking the devolpment of renewable energy technology into account³³, the fourth condition³⁴ may actually work to the disadvantage of nuclear power.
The fifth condition, that the sitings of nuclear power plants have to be carefully considered to avoid „areas most prone to severe natural hazards“ [14] could become a source for terrible mistakes due to the fact that climate change will lead to changing conditions in the landscape [57].³⁵
Finally the sixth condition³⁶ may also prove unfavourable for nuclear power, considering the still looming waste problem and the costs in case of a large scale desaster.

Finally nuclear power advocates put all hope into new technologies. However, regarding so called fast breeders Cochran et al. write in [58]: „After six decades and the expenditure of the equivalent of about $100 billion, the promise of breeder reactors remains largely unfulfilled“. They give examples of how the fast breeder programs in most states were abandoned or are (still) not promising. The same is true for Thorium reactors [59].

Finally to finish this report I’d like to mention some applications that actually make the utilization of nuclear power technology, especially reactors, necessary without an alternative. First and foremost these are nuclear weapons. If a country desires these, it needs the relevant technology.
Secondly, can the high neutron flux required for modern material research just be produced in nuclear reactors.
Thirdly, the radioactive isotopes, mainly molybdenum-99, needed in medicine are also produced in nuclear reactors. [60]
And the final reason I’d like to give here for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants is national pride and self-concept, as it was the case for France after the 2nd World War [61].
All of these application do not need to subdue to so called market mechanisms.

However, after a more or less two decade long trial and error periode, following the inauguration of nuclear power plants in the late 60’s, this technology was rejected by the market as means of producing electricity in an economically sustainable way. Or as Grubler et al. put it in [23]:

[…] [W]hile the nuclear industry is often quick to point at public opposition and regulatory uncertainty as reasons for real cost escalation, it may be more productive to start asking whether these trends are not intrinsic to the very nature of the technology itself: large-scale, lumpy, and requiring a formidable ability to manage complexity in both construction and operation. These intrinsic characteristics of the technology limit essentially all classical mechanisms of cost improvements–standardization, large series, and a large number of quasi-identical experiences that can lead to technological learning and ultimate cost reductions […] i.e., economies of scale.

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Footnotes

1. 32. After the heavy construction phase of nuclear power plants was clearly over in the U.S. and it became obvious that commercial actors had no further intentions to build more nuclear reactors. ↩

2. 33. See for example the references given in footnote 19. ↩

3. 34. ‚[A] […] licensing process that is technology-neutral, risk-informed and capable of resolving promptly any safety issues that may arise during construction and operation‘ [14]. ↩

4. 35. Also the water availibility will change throughout the world. Both insufficent availability of water (drought) as well as too much (flood) will lead to non-operation of nuclear power plants. Considering the high costs of such installations this is obviously something that is not wished for by the investors. ↩

5. 36. The introduction of the concept of payment for ‚external costs‘ [14]. ↩

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References

1. [14] B. W. Brook et al., „Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the energy mix“, Sustainable Materials and Technologies, vol. 1-2, pp. 8–16, 2014. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

2. [18] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, „Information Digest 2016-2017, NUREG-1350“, vol. 28, 2016. ↩

3. [23] A. Grubler, „Energy Policy, vol. 38, pp. 5174–5188, 2010.“, The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing ↩ ↩

4. [38] Congressional Budget Office, „Nuclear Power`s Role in Generating Electricity“, Congress of the United States, 2008. ↩

5. [55] D. D. Eisenhower, „Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy“, 1953. ↩

6. [56] The National Commision on Energy Policy, „Ending the Energy Stalemate – A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America’s Energy Challenges“, 2004. ↩

7. [57] H. Bjordal and J. O. Larsen, „Avalanche risk in a changing climate – Development of a landslide and avalanche risk model“, International Snow Science Workshop Davos, 2009. ↩

8. [58] T. B. Cochran et al., „It`s Time to Give Up on Breeder Reactors“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 66, pp. 50–56, 2010. ↩

9. [59] R. Alvarez, „Thorium: the wonder fuel that wasn`t“, Column at the webpage of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2014, (accessed 2017-07-20). ↩

10. [60] Nuclear Energy Agency, „A Supply and Demand Update of the Molybdenum-99 Market“, 2012. ↩

11. [61] G. Hecht, „The Radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II“, MIT Press, ISBN: 978-0-262-58281-0, 2009. ↩

3 Results and Discussion

3.1 Economical Aspects of Nuclear Power Plants

Building costs of nuclear power plants in the U.S.
In fig. 2 the overnight costs⁶ of already build and estimated overnight / total costs of future nuclear reactors in the U.S. can be seen.

The black dots in fig. 2 represent the actual overnight costs of up and running reactors in the United States. These costs were steadily rising over the periode of heavy construction of nuclear power plants in the 70’s and 80’s. The coloured dots in fig. 2 are estimations of the costs of new plants. As one can see are the estimations of independent actors, or the companies that actually have to take the risks, considerable higher then that of government officials und academics. If one simply extrapolates the historical data one comes to the same conclusion as one utility regarding the building costs of a new nuclear reactor. Thus for a 1 GW plant the estimated construction costs sum up to more then 10 Billion $.
This already is a considerable financial burden even for large companies. However, the coloured points in fig. 2 are just cost estimations. In fig. 3 the averaged estimated costs before construction started and realized overnight costs of the U.S. nuclear reactors that were up and running (or finished to 90 %) in 1986⁷ can be seen.

As one can see, are the realized overnight costs on average thrice as much as the estimated overnight costs. On top of that up to 30.7 % (on average 23.5 %) of the already high realized overnight costs had to be paid due to time related factors⁸ [26].

Cancellation of nuclear power plants in the U.S.
So far just data from nuclear power plants that were actually realized has been presented. In fig. 4 is shown how many units⁹ were started and how many got cancelled each year.

During the periode of heavy nuclear reactor construction in the U.S. (mainly between 1970 and 1990) 122 reactor units started operation and 89 untis got cancelled. From that could be concluded that after a couple of years of experience with nuclear reactors, utilities did not any longer want to take the risks of constructing/operating such a kind of power plant.
Also the data in fig. 4 may suggest that many reactors got cancelled due to „environmental alarmism“, and not well thought through calculations, since many cancellations took place after the core melt at the Three Mile Island plant.
However, this hypotheses can be rejected if one looks upon the development of finished / cancelled units with respect to when their construction permits were issued. This is shown in fig. 5.

Just for the reactors that started operation, the construction date, or the date when the construction permit was issued, is given in the cited sources. Since for all the cancelled reactors this information is missing, the docket numbers of these projects act as a timeline in this figure.¹⁰
The construction permit for all (or the vast majority) of the units behind these docket numbers were issued well before the Three Mile island core melt. For the realized plants construction started usually the day after the permit was issued. It seems valid to assume that this happened also for the power plants that were not finished.
What this picture shows is the following: even though the construction of many nuclear power plants was cancelled after the core melt in the Three Mile Island reactor, all these projects have already been for many years under way at the time of this incident. So the involved owners of these projects had ample time to (re)evaluate the risks and possibilities involved in such a project and many came to the conclusion that these risks are finally not worth taking. The core melt at Three Mile Island happened to be around the same time of such re-evaluations and ecological/sociological issues may have come in addition to the economic concerns which eventually lead to the abortion of almost half of all nuclear power plant projects.
Some concrete examples in how far cost escalations, and thus economically non-sustainability, lead to the abortion of nuclear power plant projects, even at very advanced stages, can be found in [27].

Operation and maintenance costs of nuclear power plants
Since the building costs (and the escalation of these) were considered to be a decisive factor for a utility to carry out the construction (or cancellation) of a nuclear power plant, these were considered in the previous sections. But when a nuclear power plant gets finished, come operation, maintenance and fuel costs in addition.
As shown in fig. 6 are the costs for maintaining and operating a nuclear reactor approximately double as high as for other kinds of plants.¹¹

Since this is again data from the U.S., it may be speculated in how far the higher costs of nuclear power plants are due to the age of these plants. However, the development of the costs over the past decade are the same for all types of power plants and not significantly steeper for the nuclear type. Thus it may be concluded that higher costs due to older plants seem not to play such an important role. In fig. 6 the costs for fuel are excluded, since historically the low price for nuclear fuel was the area in which this kind of electricity generation could outcompete all other types. With electricity generation by utilizing the sun or wind on the rise [33] this argument becomes obsolete, because the price for these two „fuels“ is zero.

The costs for nuclear fuel
As Great Britains department of trade and industry points out in [34] are „the potential benefits of new nuclear build[s] […] naturally dependent on the availability of fuel“ and since the fuel costs are considered to be one of the main advantages of nuclear power plants these shall be briefly contemplated. According to the IAEA/NEA Report „Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand“ [35]¹² were in 2014 worldwide 437 nuclear reactors online. These had a total electrical generating capacity of 377.4 GW and required 56585 tons of Uranium as fuel.¹³
In fig. 7 the worlds recoverable, conventional, reasonably assured and inferred uranium ressources (as of 2014) can be seen in dependency of the costs needed to recover them.

The total of 16.1 Million tons of recoverable uranium would last for ca. 285 years, if the demand remains constant at the 2014 value. However, with the above mentioned 1000-1500 reactors¹⁴ that should be build so that nuclear power is supposed to have a positive influence onto GHG emissions, this amount of uranium would last for just 125-85 years.¹⁵
So this simple calculation shows that nuclear power is certainly not a long term solution and even the aforementioned James Lovelock agress with those numbers and the conclusion [36]. Probably not even a mid-term solution, because, as oil, the nuclear fuel is limited and scarcity of a resource leads to a price increase, independent of the actual recovery costs.
One could argue that more then 4 billion tons of uranium are dissolved in the worlds oceans and can principally be recovered, albeit at much higher costs [35]. Such an amount would last long enough to make nuclear power a long term solution. But the higher price of the fuel will then have to be taken into account regarding the economic sustainability of uclear power.
In fig. 6 the fuel costs for operating U.S. reactors are not included, due to the low prices for nuclear fuel, compared to coal or gas. These however, can be seen in fig. 8 together with the (average) spot price for uranium according to the Euratom Supply Agency.

As one can see in fig. 8 was the price for Uranium in the last 10 years approximately a factor of five higher then the two decades before. If a trend persists since a decade, one can probably assume that it is not to be temporary but permanentely. From the prices in fig. 8 one may assume that the industry started mining the <130 USD/kgU-resources wile the remaining more profitable resources still keep the price from rising even higher. As was to be expected are the average fuel costs (red dots in fig. 8) correlated to the uranium price. While the fuel costs are still just one quarter of the costs for coal or gas power plants [32]¹⁶ lately the fuel costs make up half of the running costs of a nuclear power plant.
This may make electricty generation by nuclear power economically even less attractive then by just taking the extremely high initial costs and the twice as high operation and maintenance costs (compared to other types of conventional power plants) into account. This will get even worse when the uranium prices rise further, once the more profitable resources are exhausted.

Other economical issues in connection with nuclear power
Below I’d like to briefly mention more, economically relevant, issues that were not included in the above detailed analysis.

1. The rise of the building costs took place during a periode in which very many nuclear power plants were build in the U.S. (cf. fig. 2 and fig. 3). In such a scenario, rising construction costs are contradictory to the capitalist dogma that „demand creates supply and thus falling prices“. Spanning two decades, this periode can’t be considered short term. Either the capitalistic system is fundamentally broken or nuclear power does simply not work in it. In addition comes that since that periode more then two decades have past and most likely a consolidation of the (construction) material supply chain and skilled workers took place. Thus the construction costs of new nuclear power plants may be even higher then already anticipated, due to limited supply.
2. Externalities like waste management or the costs of large scale accidents are usually taken care of by society and not the private firms operating the plants.
3. Apart from this, at least the U.S. government actively makes more of such incentives available [38]. However an even wider range of nuclear power plant related issues are heavily subsidized. A detailed analysis of such subsidies can be found in [39]. As Koplow writes: „[t]hese subsidies […] enabled the […] reactors to be built in the first place, but have also supported their operation for decades“. Even the low-end estimate for subsidies „represents nearly 80 percent of the production-cost advantage of nuclear relative to coal.“
   Under these circumstances, the claim of Brook et al. [14] and many other nuclear power proponents, that one condition regarding the „economic viability of nuclear energy“ must be „[the] presence of a ‚level playing field‘, i.e. an open market that is not skewed in favor of some technologies by means of subsidies“, seems to be build on sand.

All of this makes nuclear energy economically unsustainable and from a „market point of view“ it should not be considered as a „climate saving technology“.

3.2 The Prospects of GHG Emission Reduction With Nuclear Power

According to the World Energy Council will by 2050 at least twice as much electricity generated worldwide [40]. That means that the proposed 1000 new nuclear power plants¹⁷ are barely enough to keep the share of electricity generated by nuclear power at the same level as of today. If nuclear power really shall have a meaningful contribution towards the reduction of GHG emissions, probably even 2000 new nuclear reactors are too low a number to achieve that goal. The point is, that very many new reactors have to be build and operated. While nuclear energy proponents claim that this type of energy is „emission free“, this is far from true.¹⁸ Over the whole life cycle of a nuclear power plant a non-neglectable amount of green house gasses is emitted. Sovacool performed in [45] a meta-analysis of the existing lifecycle studies and comes to the conclusion that on average a nuclear power plant emits ca. 66 g CO₂ equivalents per kWh. While this is approximately seven to 15 times less [46] then directly burning fossil fuels, it has to be taken into account, that in the past easy recoverable nuclear fuel was used. Among other things that means that the uranium content in the mined ore was relatively high, e.g. 1.5 % as in the study by Andseta et al. [47]¹⁹. However, fig. 9 shows that the remaining (conventional) uranium reserves are contained in ore with much lower uranium content²⁰.

Since the abscissa in fig. 9 has a logarithmic scale it can easily be seen that the remaining resources are embedded in ore with a uranium content at least several times less then in the ore that was used for nuclear fuel up until now. Actually the majority of the not recovered ore contains uranium to an extent of approximately just one hundreth of the value of the past.
Already now, the mining, milling, converting, enriching and fabrication of the nuclear fuel²¹, makes on average up almost 40 % of the emission of greenhouse gasses of nuclear power plants [45]. With a hundredfold smaller uranium content, it is to expect that in the steps to create nuclear fuel both the energy required and the direct emission of greenhouse gasses (e.g. due to mine wastes) may rise tremendously.
Taking these facts into account makes nuclear power even less to be considered as an honest option to significantly reduce GHG emission. This is especially the case since the „quality“ of solar radiation or the wind are unlikely to deteriorate.

3.3 The Social Sustainability of Nuclear Power

1. The proliferation of nuclear weapons: Nobel laureate Hannes Alfvén said „Atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins“²². This quote captures the dual-use nature of technologies that produce nuclear fuel. However, as written above, the wish to own nuclear weapons is a valid reason for nuclear power, regardless its sustainability either economical, ecological or social.
2. Large scale desasters: After the core melt of unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plants, with its catastrophic consequences, one of the main discussion points of nuclear power advocates was, that such an accident could never happen with western technology and operations standards; or in short that „our reactors are safe“ (see e.g. [51]). The core melts of units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant with the subsequent release of nuclear material [52] have shown that this assurance is quite hollow. Or as Lelieveld et al. put it in [53]: „[…] based on the evidence over the past decades one may conclude that the combined probabilities […] [of a core melt and subsequent containment failure] have been underestimated“. It is hard to imagine that the unsettling events for hundreds of thousands of humans, caused by the (often permanent) evacuation after such events; the rendering of large areas to be uninhabitable and not usable for agriculture for decades; costs in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars paid by the public²³; and the fear invoked in the general population after such desasters are desirable.
3. Non-public awareness of regular incidents at nuclear power plants: The Guardian lists 34 nuclear power plant accidents and incidents since 1952 [54]. The general public is somewhat aware of two of them, the core melts at the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear power plants. The Three Mile Island, Windscale and Sellafield accidents are barely present in the public mind. However, this is just the visible tip of the iceberg since these accidents and incidents had major consequences. The U.S. NRC Information Digest [18] lists for 2014 and 99 U.S. nuclear reactors the following average numbers.²⁴
   1. Unplanned automatic scrams²⁵ per plant while the reactor was critical: 39.
   2. Number of times a reactor had to shut down because of equipment failures: ca. 70.²⁶
   3. Number of safety system actuations²⁷: 20.
   4. Number of safety system failures²⁸: 84.
   5. And last but not least the number of significant events²⁹: 3.

   Accidents happen also in coal power plants, with windturbines and in everyday life. And the occurance of nuclear power related direct fatal casualties³⁰ may be low compared to deaths caused by air pollution due to coal power plants [14]. However, as discussed above, the wider consequences of large scale nuclear accidents are unfathomable. Also it is a fact of life that small incidents can either by chance or due to neglect, easily develop into desasters³¹. Thus it is bewildering that the number of such smaller incidents is not at all present in the discussion regarding nuclear power.

All of the here stated numbers and reasons show in my opinion the social non-sustainability of nuclear power and are probably the main reasons for many people to become or be opponents of nuclear power.

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Footnotes

1. 6. The overnight costs contain all capital costs as if the plant was build over night. In reality this is not the case and interest has to be paid, so the real costs are even higher. Naturally these values don’t contain running, fuel or decommissioning costs. ↩

2. 7. These make up the majority of the black dots in fig. 2. ↩

3. 8. Increasing relative prices and financing charges during the building period. ↩
4. 9. A unit is a nuclear reactor, one plant can have several units. ↩

5. 10. Albeit this could be checked just for the reactors that started operation, this assumption is true at least for these (with very few exceptions) and the generalization seems to be valid. ↩

6. 11. Operation and maintenance costs of solar photovoltaic systems and on- or offshore windturbines are not included in fig. 6 since „[…] there is still a significant degree of commercial sensitivity surrounding operational performance and limited data in the public domain“ as Carroll et al. write in [28]. If data is available a frequent problem is the inconsistency of the database (e.g. if land lease or insurence is included or not in the operating costs).
   For on-shore windturbines Wiser et al. present in [29] operation and maintenance costs of 34 mills/kWh, 24 mills/kWh, 10 mills/kWh and 9 mills/kWh for windturbines constructed in the U.S. respectively in the eigthies, nineties, noughties and since 2010.
   Carroll et al. calculate for off-shore windturbines operation and maintenance costs between 22-38 mills/kWh, 25-42 mills/kWh and 53-78 mills/kWh for windturbines respectively 10 km, 50 km and 100 km away from land. Approximately 90 % of these costs are in all cases due to lost production and transport to the windturbines [28]. This however, is a problem that can partly be solved when permanently occupied maintenance crew habitats become sustainable, once the off-shore wind-turbine fields become large enough. In [30] Gonzalez-Rodriguez reports 10-31 mills/kWh for the operation and mainenance costs for off-shore windturbines, compiled from different sources.
   It is harder to come by the costs for solar photovoltaic systems. The International Renewable Energy Agency presents in [31] the levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) of solar photovoltaics. These have been falling drastically in the past years due to much lower solar panel prices. However, the LCOE are by no means a measure for the operation and maintenance costs of such systems which are stated in the same report to be between 20 % to 45 % for solar photovoltaics in Europe. From the figures given for the LCOE in Europe (between approx. 100-200 mills/kWh) one can calculate that the operation and maintenance costs for solar photovoltaic systems are between 20-90 mills/kWh.
   These numbers show that the operation and maintenance costs of renewable energy systems are already comparable with nuclear power. Considering that the wide employment of these technologies is a rather new development, and taking into account foreseeable improvements and cost reductions due to mass production and other economic mechanisms, a radiant future of renewable energy can be considered. ↩

7. 12. Table 2.1. Nuclear data summary ↩

8. 13. See [35] for a possible explanation regarding the discrepancy of one reactor as stated in [18]. For the purpose of this report this difference does not matter and is not further considered. ↩

9. 14. Or the more realistic 1150-1750 reactors, if one calculates according to the „to be installed“ capacity. ↩

10. 15. Or 110-50 years, with 1150-1750 reactors respectively. ↩

11. 16. This is valid for the historically low prices for gas. Time will show if these are sustainable. ↩

12. 17. Half of these have to replace old, decomissioned ones. ↩

13. 18. The GHG emissions of renewable energy sources shall not be discussed here, but can be found e.g. in [41, 42, 43, 44]. ↩

14. 19. [47] is an updated paper of the source cited in [45]. However, it is assumed that the amount of uranium in the ore from the canadian mines, which were used as references for the study, has not changed. ↩

15. 20. Of the estimated resource range given for one deposit/mine, the upper limit was used for the numbers in fig. 9. If the resource range was stated as ‚larger than 100.000 t‘ it was taken into account as 100.000 t. Deposits/mines with missing data were not included. The slight difference in the absolute amount of resources compared to fig. 7 and given in [35] may be due to more up to date data in [48]. ↩

16. 21. The so called ‚Frontend‘ of the nuclear life cycle. ↩

17. 22. Cited in [49], earliest reference for this quote (however, not attributed directly to Alfvén) was found in [50]. ↩

18. 23. In the U.S. the owner of a nuclear power plant needs to purchase an insurance that has to cover not more then 300 million USD. If the damage adds up to not more then 10 billion USD, the costs will be shared between the owners of all U.S. nuclear power plants. [38] However, a catastrophy like Fukushima or Chernobyl have costs very much higher then 10 billion USD. ↩

19. 24. Appendix H, Industry Performance Indicators : Industry Averages, FYs 2006–2015. The document does not clearly distinguish between a nuclear power plant that may have several reactors and the reactor units themself. The numbers presented here are calculated as if the figures presented in [18] are per nuclear reactor. ↩

20. 25. According to [18] is a scram „[t]he sudden shutting down of a nuclear reactor by the rapid insertion of control rods“. ↩

21. 26. This number is somewhat obscured in a figure called ‚equipment forced outage rate per 1000 commercial critical Hours‘. The reactors in the U.S. have a capacity factor of approximately 90 %. While this can not simply be seen as the number of hours a reactor is running it can reasonably be assumed that on average the U.S. reactors are delivering electricity to the grid 7000 hours per year. With the 99 reactors operating in the U.S. the here stated number was derived. ↩

22. 27. ‚[…] certain manual or automatic actions taken to start emergency core cooling systems or emergency power systems. These systems are specifically designed to either remove heat from the reactor fuel rods if the normal core cooling system fails or to provide emergency electrical power if the normal electrical systems fail.‘ [18] ↩

23. 28. ‚[…] [A]ctual failures, events, or conditions that could prevent a system from performing its required safety function.‘ [18] ↩

24. 29. ‚[…] [F]or example, degradation of safety equipment, a sudden reactor shutdown with complications, or an unexpected response to a sudden degradation of fuel or pressure boundaries.‘ [18] ↩

25. 30. Probably even death cases because of cancer due to the exposure to radioactivity released by such accidents. ↩

26. 31. For example could the wrong type of oil (a very minor incident) for an emergency power diesel generator lead to the early failure of the same when it is a necessity that it is functioning and as a consequence the cooling water flow to the reactor may fail. ↩

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References

1. [14] B. W. Brook et al., „Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the energy mix“, Sustainable Materials and Technologies, vol. 1-2, pp. 8–16, 2014. ↩ ↩

2. [18] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, „Information Digest 2016-2017, NUREG-1350“, vol. 28, 2016. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

3. [21] J. Koomey and N. E. Hultman, „Electronic Annex for A reactor-level analysis of busbar costs for US nuclear plants, 1970–2005“, Energy Policy, vol. 35, pp. 5630–5642, 2007. ↩ ↩

4. [22] F. A. Heddleson, „Summary Data for U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States – ORNL/NUREG/NSIC-141“, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission – Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, tech. rep., 1978. ↩

5. [24] T. McConnell et al., „A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010“ (Vol. I, Vol. II), United States Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and its Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee Subcommitte on Generation IV Technology Planning, tech. rep., 2001. ↩

6. [25] D. Schlissel and B. Biewald, „Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs“, Synapse Energy Economics, Inc., 2008. ↩

7. [26] Energy Information Administration, „An Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs – DOE / EIA-0485“, U.S. Department of Energy, tech. rep., 1986. ↩ ↩

8. [27] S. Maloney, „A Critical Examination of Nuclear Power`s Costs“, chapter 2 in „The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States“, pp. 32–45. Federation of American Scientists, Washington and Lee University, 2012. ↩

9. [28] J. Carroll et al., „Availability, operation and maintenance costs of offshore wind turbines with different drive train configurations“, Wind Energy, vol. 20, pp. 361–378, 2017. ↩ ↩

10. [29] R. Wiser et al., „2014 Wind Technologie Market Report“, U.S. Department of Energy, 2015. ↩

11. [30] A. G. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, „Review of offshore wind farm cost components“, Energy for Sustainable Development, vol. 37, pp. 10–19, 2017. ↩

12. [31] Michael Taylor, Pablo Ralon, and Andrei Ilas, „The Power to Change: Solar and Wind Cost Reduction Potential to 2025“, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2016. ↩

13. [32] U.S. Energy Information Administration, „Electric Power Annual 2015“, 2016 ↩ ↩ ↩

14. [33] J. Johnson, „Renewables rise globally, coal sees sharp decline (Note)“, Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 94, no. 46, p. 17, 2016. ↩

15. [34] Department of Trade and Industry, „The Energy Challenge – Energy Review Report 2006“, TSO (The Stationery Office), 2006. ↩

16. [35] Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency, „Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand“, tech. rep., 2016. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

17. [36] D. Aitkenhead, „Saturday Interview James Lovelock: Before the end of this century, robots will have taken over“, The Guardian, 2016-09-30 (accessed 2017-07-20) ↩

18. [37] Euratom Supply Agency, „ESA average uranium prices“, 2017, (accessed 2017-07-20). ↩

19. [38] Congressional Budget Office, „Nuclear Power`s Role in Generating Electricity“, Congress of the United States, 2008. ↩ ↩

20. [39] D. Koplow, „Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies“, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011. ↩

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Abstract

In this paper the economical, ecological and social sustainability of nuclear power reactors is investigated.
Firstly, the historical records of U.S. power plants overnight costs show a more then tenfold increase during the periode in which almost the entire U.S. reactor fleet was build (throughout the 70’s, 80’s and partly in the 90’s of the last century). It is shown that this is not sustainable in a capitalistic society. Thus it is concluded that this is the only plausible reason (and not pressure from environmentalists) for the cancellation of ca. 100 plants in the U.S. In addition it is speculated upon the costs for nuclear fuel, given the data from official sources. It is shown, that the historically low prices for uranium between ca. 1985 to 2005 can not be maintained, not even in the near future. The actual fuel costs over the last decade support this result.
Secondly, given the lower ore grade of the remaining raw uranium ressources, also the ecological superiority of nuclear fuel is challenged.
Lastly, by presenting some important aspects of this type of electricty generation which are usually not present in the public debate, the social non-sustainability of nuclear power is questioned, too.

1 Introduction

Global warming due to man made greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a fact as is the out of this following change of the global climate. Humanity faces tremendous suffering if the emission of greenhouse gasses isn’t stopped as soon as possible [1].
In the „Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change“ [2] state Sims et al. [3] that the transportation sector alone „was [in 2010] responsible for approximately 23 % of total energy-related CO₂ emissions“ and Lucon et al. [4] state a figure of 19 % for the buildings sector.
Without giving references one can easily find many individual measures, technical and behavioural related, to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses within these sectors; e.g. can the material related emission of greenhouse gasses in buildings be reduced to just 30 percent by the use of modified cement [5].
Probably the greatest potential to reduce GHG emissions is to electrify the many human related activities. In contrast to the other two main GHG-emitting sectors of human society — industry and agriculture — can the processes determining the former two sectors relatively easy be transformed into electricty driven operations. The ever more presence of electrical cars is a shining example of this development. However, also the building sector has tremendous GHG reduction potential because during the many years of use of a building, three to almost up to ten times as much energy is used compared to its construction phase [6, 7, 8] and actions like heating or cooling space and water can easily be performed by electrical devices.
But looking at how electrical energy is produced, the situation does not improve with the widespread technology in use as of today. E.g. in the U.S. 2/3 of the electricity was in 2015 produced by GHG emitting technologies (coal, gas or oil) [9]¹. Thus electricity production was in 2015 responsible for ca. 30 % of the U.S. total GHG emissions. The same amount as the whole U.S. transportation sector [10]².
Thus it has to be concluded that technologies have to be employed that generate electricity by non-greenhouse gas emitting processes.

The vast majority of electricity producing machines utilize the inversion of the electromagnetical motion discovered by Michael Faraday [11]: a rotating spool in a static magnetic field (or the other way around) leads to the generation of an electrical current. Usually these spools are driven by turbines which themself are driven by a hot gass, usually watervapor. An exception to this are solar cells, because these use a different physical process to produce electricity. Also windturbines or hydroelectric power stations don’t employ hot gass. There the rotation of the spool is (more or less) directly driven by the moving wind or water.
However, the water must be heated to evaporate and be able to drive a turbine. This is achieved by burning coal, oil or gas or by using the heat released in nuclear reactions. The three former directly emit greenhouse gasses when burned. Hence, such technologies for electricity generation should be replaced as soon as possible. On account of this, one often can hear or read, that more nuclear reactors should be build to meet the demand for electricity since this technology is considered to be „emission-free“. Probably the publicly best known proponent of nuclear energy as solution for climate change is James Lovelock [12] and another typical example for nuclear energy support in the public debate may be the Washington Post’s opinion from 2017-04-01 which commented on „Westinghouse“³ going out of business under the headline „A bankruptcy that’s bad news for climate policy“ [13].
A scientific paper that provides many of the exemplary talking points of nuclear power advocates may be „Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the energy mix“ by Brook et al. [14].

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute were „[…] 11 percent of the world’s electricity production in 2014 […]“ provided by nuclear power plants [15].⁴
However, electricity is so called secondary energy converted from primary energy. Coal, oil or nuclear fuel can be considered as primary energy carriers which are transformed into secondary energy e.g. in power plants (electricity) or oil refineries (gasoline). If Nuclear Energy shall contribute substantially to the reduction of GHG emission, it must be measured against the world primary energy consumption since GHG emitting resources are used for e.g. the heating of houses (e.g. in form of coal) or transportation (in form of oil). The world primary energy consumption can be found for example in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy [17] and is shown in fig. 1.

In 2014 were 438 nuclear power plants worldwide in operation with a 379 GW electric capacity [18]. A 2003 MIT-study [19] recommends to have 1000 to 1500 nuclear power plants operating worldwide by 2050 each having an electric capacity of 1 GW. This is an often repeated number in discussions regarding nuclear power contributing significantly to GHG emission reduction in the future.
Taking the lower average electrical capacity of nowadays nuclear reactors into account actually 1150 to 1750 new reactors have to be build.
In a capitalist society this means that more then 1000 times non-state actors have to take the financial risks of building a nuclear power plant.

With these numbers in mind, this paper is meant to refute the position that nuclear energy is a solution to climate change mainly on economic grounds. I try to show that nuclear energy is by no means an „[…] affordable, economically viable […] energy service […]“ as has been called for at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg fifteen years ago [20].
I outline how the some of the economic aspects of nuclear energy have developed in the past and what that may mean for the future. The latter especially under the angle if this technology shall be used to substitute e.g. coal plants. This whole topic is very involved, due to the complexity of the underlying technologies. Hence I concentrate on the economic sustainability of nuclear power in this paper. Some ecologic and social issues are briefly covered at the end of this report.

2 Method

To research the topic of the sustainibility of nuclear power plants mainly publicly available technical and statistical reports and some scientific papers were evaluated. The figures given there were compiled, compared and/or visualized for analysis and the conclusions drawn from this analysis are presented in this paper.⁵
However, this paper should not be seen as a literature overview.

The biggest limitation of this analysis is that it is U.S. centric due to the chosen/availibility of first hand documents. However, this is not to be seen as a major disadvantage or may not limit the conclusions due to the following reasons. Firstly, almost one fourth of all operating nuclear reactors can be found in the United States. Approximately one third of the electricity worldwide generated by nuclear power plants is produced by these [18]. Thus it can be concluded that the U.S. situation can reasonably be used as a model for the proposal to employ more nuclear power.
Secondly, the United States can be seen as the model country for a capitalistic system. That means that as many enterprises as possible should be inititated, build, maintained, operated etc. by private actors. At least all profitable enterprises. This is the basic assumption under which the economical conclusions below are made. If this assumption, that nuclear power has to function under capitalistic conditions, is not true (e.g. because nuclear power is wanted for political, defense, prestige, research, medical or many other reasons) then the below stated conclusions may still be true, but irrelevant.
Thirdly, the situation in France (the country with the second largest nuclear reactor fleet) is pretty similar [23].

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Footnotes

1. 1. Table 1.1. Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Sectors), 2007-March 2017 ↩

2. 2. Table ES-6: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allocated to Economic Sectors (MMT CO2 Eq.) ↩

3. 3. One of the largest nuclear power reactor producers. ↩

4. 4. Or 10.6 percent according to the International Energy Agency [16]. ↩

5. 5. All data within the context of nuclear reactors presented here is just for commercial nuclear power plants. Though, due to the lack of data, a few plants had to be omitted by Koomey and Hultman from their analysis, tables A-1a and A-1b in [21] show extensive data for almost all U.S. nuclear power plants that eventually started operation. This includes the dates when construction started and commercial operation actually began. However, the docket numbers are missing. In Table 1 in [22] all applied for nuclear units up to March 1978 are listed, including their docket numbers. However, due to the publishing date of this report, finishing times of a lot of the units were estimated, this includes units that eventually got cancelled. Appendix A in [18] presents some data for the nuclear reactors still operating (incl. the dates when the construction permit was issued and commercial operation started). Appendix D in the same source presents data for cancelled nuclear power reactors. Comparison of these three sources lead to the numbers presented in fig. 4 and fig. 5.
   All units that are listed as operating or cancelled/withdrawn in any of these three data sets, up to the stated years, are included in fig. 4. Not included are units that were stated as „uncertain“ in [22], Watts Bar unit 2 (docket number 50-391) and the Bellefonte units 1 and 2 (docket numbers 50-438/439) since these three are still under construction [18]. The WPPSS unit 2 (docket number 50-397) in [22] was identified to be „Columbia Generating Station“ in [21] and [18]. ↩

---

References

1. [1] K. Richardson et al., „Synthesis Report from Climate Change – Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions, Copenhagen 2009“, University of Copenhagen, ISBN: 978-87-90655-68-6 ↩

2. [2] O. Edenhofer et al., „Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change“, Cambridge University Press, 2014. ↩

3. [3] R. Sims et al., „Transport“ in „Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change“, pp. 599–670. Cambridge University Press, 2014. ↩

4. [4] O. Lucon et al., „Buildings“ in „Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change“, pp. 671–738. Cambridge University Press, 2014. ↩

5. [5] K. Celik et al., „Mechanical properties, durability, and life-cycle assessment of self-consolidating concrete mixtures made with blended portland cements containing fly ash and limestone powder“, Cement and Concrete Composites, vol. 56, pp. 59–72, 2015. ↩

6. [6] R. J. Cole and P. C. Kernan, „Life-Cycle Energy Use in Office Buildings“, Building and Environment, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 307–317, 1996. ↩

7. [7] B. N. Winther and A. G. Hestnes, „Solar Versus Green: The Analysis of a Norwegian Row House“, Solar Energy, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 387–393, 1999. ↩

8. [8] O. F. Kofoworola and S. H. Gheewala, „Life cycle energy assessment of a typical office building in Thailand“, Energy and Buildings, vol. 41, pp. 1076–1083, 2009. ↩

9. [9] U.S. Energy Information Administration, „Electric Power Monthly with Data for March 2017“, 2017 ↩

10. [10] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, „Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990 – 2015“, 2017 ↩

11. [11] M. Faraday, „On some new Electro-Magnetical Motions, and on the Theory of Magnetism“ in chapter „Papers on Electricity from the Quarterly Journal of Science, Philosophical Magazine, &c“ in „Experimental Researches in Electricity 2“, pp. 127–147 Richard and John Edward Taylor, 1844. ↩

12. [12] J. Lovelock, „Nuclear power is the only green solution“, The Independent, 2004-05-23 (accessed 2017-07-20). ↩

13. [13] Editorial Board of the Washington Post, „A bankruptcy that`s bad news for climate policy“, Washington Post, 2017-04-01 (accessed 2017-07-20). ↩

14. [14] B. W. Brook et al., „Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the energy mix“, Sustainable Materials and Technologies, vol. 1-2, pp. 8–16, 2014. ↩

15. [15] Nuclear Energy Institute, „World Statistics Nuclear Energy Around the World“, 2017 ↩

16. [16] International Energy Agency, „Key world energy statistics“, 2016 ↩ ↩

17. [17] „BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016“ ↩ ↩

18. [18] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, „Information Digest 2016-2017, NUREG-1350“, vol. 28, 2016. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

19. [19] S. Ansolabehere et al., „The Future of Nuclear Power“, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. ↩

20. [20] Team of Authors, „Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development“, United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002. ↩

21. [21] J. Koomey and N. E. Hultman, „Electronic Annex for A reactor-level analysis of busbar costs for US nuclear plants, 1970–2005“, Energy Policy, vol. 35, pp. 5630–5642, 2007. ↩ ↩

22. [22] F. A. Heddleson, „Summary Data for U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States – ORNL/NUREG/NSIC-141“, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission – Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, tech. rep., 1978. ↩ ↩ ↩

23. [23] A. Grubler, „The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing“, Energy Policy, vol. 38, pp. 5174–5188, 2010. ↩

Neulich liesz ich mich ja mal ueber die Vergaenglichkeit der Dinge und ueberhaupt von Information aus. Dieser Beitrag hier faellt in die gleiche Kategorie.

Denn wir glauben ja, dass wir irgendwie schon so’n bisschen was (im Sinne von „eigentllich ’ne ganze Menge“) wissen ueber die ollen Rømer. Denn das ist ja erst 2000 Jahre her.

Aber keiner weisz so richtig, wofuer die Rømer so viele Dodecahedrons brauchten:

As no classical accounts or narratives seem to mention them, the purpose of this mysterious object remains a puzzling mystery that has confused archaeologists since their first discovery.

Ein paar møgliche Erklaerungen werden in dem Artikel zwar angefuehrt, aber mich duenkt, dass die einfach nur total gerne Dungeons and Dragons gespielt haben. :P

Vor einer Weile schrieb ich einen Artikel mit einem aehnlichen Titel.
Ich møchte diesen Beitrag auf die gleiche Weise einleiten.

Warum wir den Feminismus brauchen:

Ich bin der festen Ueberzeugung, dass die zugrundeliegenden Missstaende warum die #MeToo Bewegung ueberhaupt existiert, absolut vorhanden sind und UNBEDINGT (!) abgeschafft gehøren! Der verlinkte wikipedia-Artikel erklaert das alles auch so schøn rational und ausgeglichen.

Aber wie ich es in meinem oben verlinkten aelteren Artikel bereits zum Ausdruck brachte, so mache ich mir wieder mal Sorgen, ob nicht diese gute Sache von lauten Schreihaelsen missbraucht wird.  Und dass eben diese, der Sache eher im Wege stehen und mehr Schaden anrichten als Gutes tun.

Aber wie so oft drueckt wer anders sich viel besser aus:

[w]hat began as freeing women up to speak has today turned into the opposite – we intimidate people into speaking ‘correctly’, shout down those who don’t fall into line, and those women who refused to bend [to the new realities] are regarded as complicit and traitors.

[…]

Instead of helping women this frenzy to send these (male chauvinist) ‘pigs’ to the abattoir actually helps the enemies of sexual liberty – religious extremists and the worst sort of reactionaries […].

Hier ist das uebersetzte Original zu finden.

Das (weibliche) Autorenkollektiv dieses offenen Briefes schreibt dann auch:

As women, we don’t recognize ourselves in this feminism that, beyond the denunciation of abuses of power, takes the face of a hatred of men and sexuality. We believe that the freedom to say „no“ to a sexual proposition cannot exist without the freedom to bother. And we consider that one must know how to respond to this freedom to bother in ways other than by closing ourselves off in the role of the prey.

So! Das ist vøllig aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen und ihr, meine lieben Leserinnen und Leser, schaut jetzt bitte nach was die mit „to bother“ meinen.

Und nun kann man hier einwenden: Na aber das sind Frauen in Machtpositionen und die sind in keinem (monetaeren) Abhaengigkeitsverhaeltnis und sowieso und so weiter und so fort …

Tja! Stimmt auch! (<= Ausrufezeichen) Aber das raeumte ich ja bereits ganz oben ein. Direkt unter dem Bild, welches ich als Beispiel nahm, warum wir den Feminismus brauchen.

Nur macht das die anderen Aussagen nicht ungueltig.

Ich hoffe, dass nirgendwo in dem von mir Geschriebenen der Gedanke aufkommen konnte, dass es eine ganz allgemeingueltige, hundertfuenfprozentige und absolut wahre Løsung dieses Problems gibt. Siehe auch neulich hier.

Und deswegen schliesze ich diesen schwer verdaulichen Artikel auch ohne „Dessert“. Denn das der komische „Nachgeschmack“ soll ruhig so bleiben.

In diesem Beitrag wertete ich aus, wie viele Trophies ich pro viertel Stunde erhielt.

Hier noch mal zur Erinnerung das Hauptresultat:

Ich war total gluecklich, weil ich dachte, dass ich ein komisches Muster entdeckt haette.
Und natuerlich fand ich auch eine Erklaerung fuer diese komische Haeufung von Trophies so kurz nach Mitternacht.
Und es machte mich auch ueberhaupt nicht so richtig stutzig, dass diese Haeufung ziemlich gut die Luecke so kurz nach der Mittagsstunde fuellen wuerde.
Denn auch dafuer hatte ich eine durchaus plausible Erklaerung.

Aber nun ja … manchmal liegt ein Fehler vor. In diesem Fall kann man das irgendwie als „menschliches Versagen“ bezeichnen.

Denn bei der Trophiestatistik im Internet, wo ich die Uhrzeiten von bezog, wurde das „A.M./P.M“-Zeitformat benutzt.
Und weil nicht weiter drueber nachdachte, war es fuer mich klar, dass „12:01 p.m.“ natuerlich eine Minute nach Mitternacht ist.
Entsprechend programmierte ich meinen Algorithmus zur Auswertung der Rohdaten.

Aber dem ist nicht so. „12:01 p.m.“ ist natuerlich eine Minute post meridiem. *facepalm*

Ich schrieb mein Program um und dies ist das richtige Ergebnis (inklusive der neuen Trophies, die ich seitdem erhielt):

Das ist natuerlich laengst nicht so spektakulaer, da sich wie erwartet das meiste zocken am Nachmittag und Abend ereignet.

Schade eigentlich :( … das falsche Ergebnis war cooler.

Auf die Schliche dieses Fehlers kam ich durch das Spiel „The Order: 1886“ das spielte ich naemlich innerhalb von 24 Stunden durch. Und mir war noch im Gedaechtnis, wann ich einige der Trophies erhielt, weil man die nur spaet im Spiel erhalten konnte. Und das haute nicht hin mit den Daten die mein Program ausspuckte.

Zum Glueck, war das einfach zu korrigieren.

Nein, dieser Eintrag hat nichts mit dem Wetter hier in Norwegen zu tun.

Vielmehr ist’s schon wieder „Science“, denn neulich stolperte ich ueber das hier (das Kleingedruckte muss nicht gelesen werden, denn das zitiere ich weiter unten nochmal separat):

Zunaechst dachte ich so .oO(Ach neeeeeee! Schon wieder) …

Kurz darauf dachte ich dann aber .oO(Moment! Das passt viel zu gut in mein Narrativ! Da schaue ich mal lieber nach der Originalquelle.)

Es dauerte eine kleine Weile bevor ich Arthur R. Jensen’s Buch „Bias in Mental Testing“ (The Free Press, 1980) fand. Ich habe das nicht gelesen, aber dort steht tatsaechlich auf Seite 172:

The idea that anything as subtle and complex as all the manifestations of changes in temperature could be measured and quantified on a single numerical scale was scoffed at as impossible, even by the leading philosophers of the sixteenth century.

Also schon wieder so eine ganz bestimmt wahre Wahrheit, die falsifiziert wurde. Nur bei diesem Beispiel schrieben keine prominenten Cartoonisten, dass es „Science Biggest Fail“ waere, oder dass es schwer waere der Wissenschaft zu vertrauen. Vielmehr habe ich den Eindruck, dass die allermeisten Leute diesen Korrekturmechanismus in diesem Fall als ganz selbstverstaendlich ansehen.

Im uebrigen basierte diese falsifizierte Wahrheit auch hier wieder darauf, dass ein nuetzliches Konzept noch nicht entdeckt war: die wissenschaftlich definierte Temperatur.

Temperature was then confounded with all the subtleties of subjective judgment, which easily seem incompatible with a single numerical scale of measurement. How could the height of a column of mercury in a glass tube possibly reflect the rich varieties of temperature—damp cold, dank cold, frosty cold, crisp cold, humid heat, searing heat, scalding heat, dry heat, feverish heat, prickly heat, and so on?

Hinzu kam, dass die Messtechnik einfach noch nicht so weit war. Sowohl technisch, als auch (wieder mal) in den Konzepten.

The early thermometers were inconsistent, both with themselves and with each other. Because they consisted of open-ended glass tubes, they were sensitive to changes in barometric pressure as well as to temperature. And there were problems of calibration, such as where to locate the zero point and how to divide the column of mercury into units. It was believed, incorrectly, that all caves had the same temperature, so thermometers were calibrated in caves.

Cool wa! Wie „Science“ das interne Problem ganz von alleine geløst hat.

Im Uebrigen møchte ich aber sagen, dass auch die technische Definiton der Temperatur NICHT die reine Wahrheit ist. Dieses Konzept ist in sich natuerlich konsist, von groszer genereller Wichtigkeit und ich denke nicht, dass es bzgl. allem Technischen anders sein kønnte.

Aber das was die Philosophen damals dachten ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen.

Ja klar „damp cold, dank cold, frosty cold“ kønnen wir auch irgendwie wissenschaftlich deutlicher (und vor allem messbarer) beschreiben; Stichwørter sind hier bspw. Luftfeuchtigkeit und Windgeschwindigkeit.
Aber Menschen sind keine Messinstrumente und packen all dies in ein „Ding“, was wir nun mal „Temperatur“ nennen. Wir fragen naemlich „wie warm ist’s’n drauszen?“. Und -10 Grad Celsius bei niedriger Luftfeuchtigkeit und ohne Wind ist einfach mal nicht so kalt wie -5 Grad Celsius bei hoher Luftfeuchtigkeit und starkem Wind.

Aber vermutlich ist sogar das wissenschaftlich definier und messbar. Science eben.

Dann kommt aber hinzu, wie viel kaelter (DA! „kalt“! Schon wieder bezieht sich alles auf die Temperatur!) sich ein und das selbe Wetter anfuehlt, wenn man krank ist verglichen mit wenn man gesund ist.

Oder dass 4 Grad Celsius im August irgendwie kaelter sind, als 4 Grad Celsius im Februar.

Oder … … … Oder … … … Oder … … … … … …

Der Punkt des Ganzen ist zweifach:
1.: Wir kønnten die Sprache veraendern und alles das was wir mit subjektiver Temperature verbinden als „Temperatur“ bezeichnen und alles was technische Temperatur ist mit „Risimif“. Das waere interessant und wuerde die Klarheit der Sprache deutlich verbessern. Oder, …
2.: … wir akzeptieren einfach, dass es sowas wie die absolute, hundertdreiundzwanzigprozentige und  sowieso und ueberhaupt Wahrheit nicht gibt. Insbesondere (!) nicht in der Wissenschaft. Es gibt extrem gute Modelle, die nicht nur die Mehrzahl der Beobachtungen beschreiben und neue Phaenomene vorhersagen kønnen, aber die Relevanz dieser Modelle ist niemals universell! Denn was interessiert mich das Higgs-Boson, wenn ich Schokolade esse?

Und das meine ich nicht nur bei technischen Problemen so. Sondern auch (und INSBESONDERE) bei sozialen, gesellschaftlichen Herausforderungen.

Will ich Privatsphaere haben, wenn eine freie Verfuegbarkeit aller meiner Lebensdaten mein Leben um 20 gute Jahre (also nicht nur statistische Jahre!) verlaengern kønnte?

Sind wir als Gesellschaft wirklich reicher, wenn so viele Menschen ihren Kindern kein Obst mit zur Schule geben kønnen?
Kuemmert mich das ueberhaupt?
Ist das moralisch verwerflich, falls es mich nicht kuemmert?
Ist es moralisch verwerflich dass ich mich da nicht drum kuemmern will, weil ich depressiv werden wuerde, wenn es mich zu sehr kuemmern wuerde? (Siehe bspw. der Burnout so vieler Aktivisten.) …
Ach ist schon ok, du kannst dich nicht um alles kuemmern … Ist es auch ok, wenn es um den Klimawandel geht? … Ach … ist schon ok zu fliegen … du faehrst ja sonst mit dem Fahrrad.

Und die Nazis? Und Trump? Alles Nonsens? Oder irgendwie doch auch Wahrheit? Eine, die wir nur nicht wahr haben wollen?

Geil wa! Nun sind wir voll in der postmodernen Kritik drin … oder im Post-faktischen wie es „neu“ erfunden wurde vor kurzem. Also „post-faktisch“ im Sinne davon, dass es im Wesentlichen keine ultimative Wahrheit gibt (auszer so, wie es weiter oben steht, also die Wahrheit innerhalb ihrer eigenen Grenzen … aber das ist ja dann nicht universell). Aber wie ordne ich denn nun „Flat Earthers“ ein? … siehste … nicht mal die Aussage, dass es keine universelle Wahrheit gibt scheint universell zu sein … geil wa!

.oO(Ich glaube ich ordne diesen Artikel unter „Weltanschauung“ ein)

YEAH BABY! Gødel laeszt grueszen … tihihihi … auch wenn es bei Gødel im Grunde um was ganz Anderes geht.

Ich kønnte noch eine ganze Weile weiterschreiben, denn das Thema macht mir einfach zu viel Freude. Aber ich breche an dieser Stelle lieber ab. Und ihr, meine lieben Leser (<= mit voller Absicht so geschrieben :P *freut sich*) denkt mal drueber nach und verteidigt die Trump Waehler, wenn dieses Thema das naechste Mal aufkommt. Das macht auch viel mehr Freude (wenn auch nicht Freunde :P ).

.oO(Herrlich, wie sich dieser Beitrag entwickelt hat. Denn die urspruengliche Idee war eine ganz andere. So macht das Schreiben Spasz.)

.oO(STOOOOOOP! … tihihihi *gg*)

Nun ist dann doch Schluss mit Hellboy. Zumindest mit den Sachen, die ich in dieser wunderschønen Edition habe.

Hellboy ist mglw. weniger leicht verdaulich als andere grosze und wichtige Sachen auf dem Gebiet der 9. Kunst.

Aber es ist sooooooooo krass und ich møchte empfehle euch, meinen lieben Leserinnen und Lesern, diese Serie ohne Wenn und Aber. Und wenn man das in der gesammelten Form so irgendwie „im Nachhinein“ betrachtet, dann stellt sich in einem Drinne schon ein (wenn auch diffuses und zumindest von mir nicht wirkklich in Worte zu fassendes) Verstehen ein, warum Hellboy so einflussreich gewesen ist. Insb. auch auszerhalb der Comics.

… noch nicht. Aber nach vielem Ueben ist es mittlerweile manchmal so, dass die alten (mich durchaus am (sozialen) vorwaerts kommen hindernden) Dogmen mir nicht unmittelbar in die Magengrube hauen.

HAEH?

Ich sasz bei einem Bekannten und der wollte ein Foto an einen anderen (gemeinsamen) Bekannten schicken. Aus dem Zusammenhang war klar, dass ich mit auf dem Foto drauf sein sollte. Und meine erste (auch verbal geaeuszerte) Reaktion war

I don’t mind.

Unmittelbar gefolgt von:

.oO(HALT STOP! DIENST UEBER’S INTERNET AUF DEN COMPUTERN ANDERER LEUTE! … AAAAAAAAARGHAGRHGAHGR)

Wie die Gedankenblase andeutet, aeuszerte ich dies nicht laut.

Und dann kam der bewusste Gedanke:

.oO(Schon ok! Ich muss auch irgendwann mal mit den geaenderten Gegegbenheiten zurecht kommen)

Und dann war ich sehr gluecklich. Ueber das, was ich schon schaffe :) …

Babyschritte, sind besser als gar keine Schritte.